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Recent Developments
Muir v. State: CLARIFYING
PREDICATE CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE UNDER MARYLAND'S
ENHANCED PUNISHMENT
STATUTE.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently decided in Muir v. State, 308 Md.
208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986), that convictions of robbery and attempted robbery by
a general court-martial tribunal of the
United States Army may be considered as
predicate crimes of violence under Md.
Ann. Code art. 27 § 643B (1982 Repl.
Vol., 1985 Cum. Supp.).
Gary Michael Muir pleaded guilty before a general court-martial in 1969 of two
separate robberies and one attempted robbery of three different soldiers; each offense involved the use of a knife. He was
sentenced to three years' imprisonment in
a military prison. Muir was then seventeen
years old and a soldier in the U.S. Army.
Subsequently, he was convicted of second
degree rape in the Circuit Court for Anne
Arundel County for which he served a period of imprisonment.
Maryland's enhanced punishment statute
for repeat offenders, Article 27, § 643B requires, in subsection (c), the imposition of
a mandatory sentence of not less than
twenty-five years upon any person who,
under specified conditions, is convicted a
third time of a "crime of violence."' Subsection (a) of the statute defines a "crime of
violence." 2
In the present case, Muir was convicted
in the Circuit Court for Prince George's
County of attempted first and second degree sexual offenses, burglary, and assault
with intent to disable. At sentencing, evidence was adduced of his earlier court-martial and rape convictions for the purpose of
enhancing the sentence under § 643B.
Acting under the statute, the trial judge
sentenced Muir to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on the count
charging attempted first degree sexual offense.
On certiorari review before the court of
appeals, Muir argued that his court-martial convictions for crimes of violence
could not be deemed qualifying predicate
offenses under § 643B because of the existing procedural and substantive differences
between the civil and military justice sys-

terns. Muir also contended that in view of
his age in 1969, the court-martial convictions should be viewed under Maryland
law only as juvenile offenses, not as crimes,
and are therefore precluded from consideration in determining the applicability of
§ 643B(c).
In holding that court-martial convictions
may be considered predicate crimes of violence under § 643B, the court stated that
the purpose of § 643B "is to protect the
public from assaults upon people and injury to property and to deter repeat offenders from perpetrating other criminal
acts of violence under the threat of an extended period of confinement." 308 Md.
at 214, 517 A.2d at 1108.
The Muir court also noted that the statute
has been afforded broad application to persons convicted a third time of a crime of
violence. For example, equivalent convictions in jurisdictions outside of Maryland
of crimes of violence within the ambit of
§ 643(a) may be considered as predicate
offenses for purposes of sentencing under
the statute's provisions. See, Temoney v.
State, 290 Md. 251, 429 A.2d 1018
( 1981 )_; Dibartolomeo v. State, 61 Md.
App. 302, 486 A.2d 256 ( 1985).
The Court of Appeals of Maryland conceded that there are many differences between the systems of military and civilian
justice. However, the court found persuasive the opinion of the Supreme Court
in Burns v. Richardson, 346 U.S. 137
( 1953), wherein it was noted that "military
courts, like state courts, have the same
responsibilities as do the federal courts to
protect a person from a violation of his
constitutional rights." 346 U.S. at 142.
The Burns court further observed that
through the then recently completed revision of the Articles ofWar, and the establishment of a Uniform Code of Military
Justice, Congress "has taken great care to
define the rights of those subject to military
law, and to provide a complete system of
review within the military system to secure
those rights." 346 U.S. at 142.
Many of the rights afforded an accused
under the military justice system were outlined in Burns. These include: ( 1) a trial as
free as possible from command influence;
(2) the right to prompt arraignment; (3) the
right to counsel of the accused's own choosing; and (4) the right to secure witnesses

and prepare an adequate defense.
The court of appeals briefly addressed
Muir's contention that because he would
have been deemed a juvenile had he committed the offenses as a civilian in Maryland, these offenses should not be considered as predicated offenses under§ 643B(a).
The court stated that omitting these convictions as predicate crimes of violence
would thwart the legislative purpose of
protecting the public and deterring the
commission of violent offenses. 308 Md.
at 218,517 A.2a at 1110.
Thus, the present case is significant because it clarifies, and perhaps broadens,
the types of offenses which are applicable
in Maryland as predicate crimes of violence under § 643B. Offenders are now on
notice that previous general court-martial
convictions, regardless of the age of the
convicted, may be used to enhance punishment under the Maryland statute.
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Notes
'Subsection (c) provides, in part:
"Any person who (I) has been convicted on
two separate occasions of a crime of violence
where the convictions do not arise from a single
incident, and (2) has served at least one term
of confinement in a correctional institution as
a result of a conviction of a crime of violence,
shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third
time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment
for the term allowed by law, but, in any event,
not less than 25 years."
2Subsection (a) defines "crimes of violence" to mean:
"abduction; arson; burglary; daytime housebreaking under § 30 (b) of this Article; kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary
manslaughter; mayhem and maiming under
§§ 384, 385 and 386 of this article; murder;
rape; robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon;
sexual offense in the first degree; sexual offense in the second degree; use of a handgun
in the commission of a felony or other crime
of violence; an attempt to commit any of the
aforesaid offenses; assault with intent to
murder; and assault with intent to rape."
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